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Global monetary policy is tightening. Following Japan’s return to an inflationary 
environment, liquidity is getting scarce and investors are increasingly discriminating 
risks. So-called ‘carry trades’, which ensured high return for little risk, are no longer 
sustainable, as interest rate indicators of the Triad countries are pointing upwards. 
Such macroeconomic movements pose worrying problems for open economies that 
financed their external dependence with ease in the environment of excess liquidity 
that prevailed over the past five years. 
 
Such monetary contraction can be problematic for small open countries that rely 
heavily on external financing, especially on portfolio investments. In fact, for such 
economies, the interest rate leverage is rather ineffective in luring foreign 
investment. Therefore recent evolutions have caused great concern for small 
economies such as Hungary, New Zealand and Iceland, which traditionally trade a 
considerable fraction of their GDP and rely heavily on external financing to finance 
their current account deficits. In stress situations or when the macroeconomic 
situation unwinds, those countries are among the first to be exposed to external 
shocks, and face considerable macroeconomic volatility. The experience of Iceland 
is particularly relevant as some indicators echo to some extent the school-case 
scenario of a capital account crisis, and furthermore deliver a similar picture to that 
of the United States’ situation. 
 
 
Iceland, a small open economy in the twilight of external volatility 
 
Iceland’s economic performance is impressive. Unemployment i s  a l m o s t  n o n -
existent; the economy has followed a process of economic diversification away from 
its traditional industries (i.e. fisheries) towards high value added activities (i.e. 
banking, biotechnology and software industry). Internally, Iceland’s latest 
accumulation of wealth was mainly induced by a credit boom, exponential growth of 
housing prices and foreign debt accumulation. Icelandic banks’ debts have reached 
the equivalent of 150% of Iceland’s GDP and many credits lines will mature over 
the next two years, suggesting the loom of a banking crisis. Considering that the 
country’s debt reaches 300% of GDP, debt default seems highly probable to some 
observers. In order to address such internal imbalances, Iceland’s central bank 
wants to slow credit growth and has announced further interest rate hikes. 
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Figure 1. Credit activity in Iceland 
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Externally, Iceland is highly exposed. Being the paradigm of a small open economy, 
Iceland faces a structural current account deficit, which causes the country to be 
dependent on external financing. In fact as Figure 2 illustrates, Iceland finances its trade 
dependence through foreign investment, especially portfolio investment. 
 
Figure 2. Iceland: A small open economy 
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Since 2003, foreign investors financed Iceland’s current account deficit by purchasing 
Icelandic bonds, inducing an increased exposure of the Icelandic economy to exchange 
rate fluctuations. The low-yield environment that prevailed in global markets has 
awakened investors’ appetite for the higher-yielding Icelandic bonds. Two factors on the  
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supply side are at the root of investors’ attention for Iceland’s securities market. Firstly, 
in July 2004, the Housing Financing Fund (HFF), a fully state-controlled agency, has 
initiated the issuance of HFF bonds to finance HFF’s mortgage loans. Secondly, foreign 
financial institutions issued in August 2005 non-indexed ISK Eurobonds.
2 Those funds 
turned out to be successful, and the amount outstanding in December 2005 largely 
overshadowed the amount of government securities as well as the amount outstanding of 
treasury notes.
3 As a consequence, the total market value of Iceland’s fixed income 
securities at the end of November 2005 roughly equals the year’s GDP. The issuance of 
those financial products has safeguarded the financing of Iceland’s external dependence. 
Additionally, the dynamism of the Icelandic economy lured many investors to invest their 
equity capital in the Icelandic stock market, which outperformed all European stock 
exchanges over the past four years. Nowadays, since the buoyancy of the credit 
expansion has to be tamed, most analysts agree that Iceland faces a recession for the 
time to come. The response has been a sudden massive selling of Eurobonds issued by 
non-residents (for the first time since 2002 the net figure is negative), which is primarily 
due to the economic outlook but also to the anticipation of exchange rate depreciation. 
The central bank’s data underscore the fact that most outflows in March 2006 were 
equity capital. 
 
Figure 3. Iceland: Foreign exchange 
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Despite the loss of confidence from foreign investors, net purchases of Icelandic 
securities by residents largely compensated for the outflow, averting in the short term 
concerns about a potential current account crisis. Nevertheless, the sustainability of such 
an outflow is highly doubtful, and the Icelandic central bank reacted by revising its 
interest rate upwards (11.5%), in order to temper the capital outflow by rewarding 
investors who stay put.  
 
                                                 
2 Also called ‘glacier bonds’.
 
3 As of December 2005, the amount outstanding of ISK Eurobonds = 152 billion ISK; the amount outstanding of 
treasury notes = 64 billion ISK and the amount outstanding of government securities = 101 billion ISK, 
according to Landsbankinn, January 2006.  
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Figure 4. Iceland: Portfolio investment 
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More recently, concerns about the short-term sustainability resurfaced as the two latest 
offerings of Icelandic government bonds were cancelled by the Icelandic National Debt 
Management Agency, because investors were demanding too high yields. This 
cancellation does not amount to a lending crisis, since the treasury didn’t need the debt 
issuance to balance its accounts, but rather aimed at offering a more continuous yield 
curve with the planned issuance. 
 
 
1998 in the head, credit bubble in the legs 
 
The scenario recalls to some extent the Asian situation of an increasingly integrated 
economy in the financial world that has to face considerable ‘imbalances’.
4 Some 
alarming reports have been written by Danske Bank announcing a “geyser crisis” and a 
hard landing for 2006-07. On the other hand, some argue that the consequences will not 
be as harsh as in Asia because the currency depreciation was largely anticipated.
5 Apart 
from this remark, it must be stressed that the most obvious differences that must be 
taken into account in comparing and extrapolating the Asian crisis to Iceland’s situation 
are the exchange rate regime on the one hand, and the banking structure, on the other, 
the latter being the most crucial. In fact, a flexible, well-functioning inter-banking market 
could indeed absorb the external shock that has just hit the country, and prevent internal 
credit bubble from bursting as they did in Thailand. 
 
Systemic bank risk will rise in the next six months, and efforts have to be made by 
Icelandic banks to discriminate risk appropriately. As Figure 1 emphasised, lending 
activity in the Icelandic banking sector has grown exponentially. The problem faced by 
the banking sector is the huge build-up of credit lines on banks’ balance sheets because 
of sustained low interest rates of equity and property bubbles. Nevertheless, stress tests 
performed by the central bank suggest that the Icelandic banking sector can in its 
current configuration withstand large shocks. Furthermore, the worst being announced 
for Iceland over the past months, risks in the banking sectors seem to be identified and 
banks have taken steps to meet their funding needs in the short term. Careful liquidity 
                                                 
4 Or rather deficit to be economically correct, since from an accounting perspective, an economy’s accounts are 
always balanced.
 
5 “Is something rotten in the state of Iceland?”, Insight, Landsbankinn, 22nd March 2006, p. 1.
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management, the reduction of cross-holdings of equities and increased vigilance of credit 
quality are the issues to be addressed in the short-term policies of the Icelandic banking 
sector, in order to safeguard a smooth adaptation to the new macroeconomic 
environment prevailing in world financial markets. 
 
 
Is Iceland willing to trade a stable exchange rate for its economic dynamism? 
‘Small and exponential’ or ‘big and linear’? 
 
In the wake of the above-described external volatility, some observers have asked 
whether Iceland should join the eurozone. For a small open economy, joining the 
eurozone would greatly reduce the external dependence and deliver a stable currency 
that fosters its externally-led development. Membership of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) has in fact greatly benefited small open economies that fostered their trade relying 
on the strength of the euro, but less clearly the bigger countries, which have faced large 
difficulties to grasp the benefits of the euro. Thus for Iceland it could seem pertinent to 
explore to what extent its small open economy in the twilight of external volatility could 
consider eurozone accession in order to avoid external macroeconomic stress. Last 
month, in fact, Mr Asgrimsson, the Prime Minister of Iceland, predicted that Iceland 
would become a member of the EU by 2015.
6 Furthermore, the Ministers for Commerce 
and Industry are eager to push the economy towards euroisation. 
 
The first economic benefit if Iceland would enter the EMU would be that the scenario 
sketched out above could be avoided. In fact, 70% of its imports and exports would 
henceforth be issued in euro, considerably reducing uncertainty about future payments 
and preventing adverse effects on the forex market to cause major disruptions on the 
financial sector.  
 
Nevertheless, public opinion remains split between two equally weighted groups, and 
hopes that the current tensions could tip the balance in favour of adopting the euro seem 
unrealistic, in light of the rather stagnant public debate on the euro issue. In order to 
avoid a Norway-like scenario, a long-term debate needs to be initiated. The newly 
emerging need for a stable currency is in fact the most persuasive argument for joining 
the EU, and could potentially convince the traditionally eurosceptic Iceland to seriously 
consider adhesion.  
 
On the other hand, considering that Iceland’s greatest current economic advantage is the 
fact that it is a small, flexible (but albeit volatile) economy, the prospect of trading this 
advantage for the heavy weight of European regulation with its linear economic path, is 
worth a cost-benefit analysis. For Iceland the deal would be to swap its status of dynamic 
economy and the legislative measures that lured foreign investors as well as hedge 
funds, in exchange for European regulation and adopt a monetary policy that doesn’t 
necessarily reflect the internal economic situation of the country. 
                                                 
6 “Euro dreams”, The Economist, 2 March 2006.
 